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Abstract.    The  paper  traces  a  pathway  through  the 
existing space of argumentation surrounding the original 
Turing Test (TT) and the discipline of ‘Strong’ Artificial 
Intelligence  that  followed  on  from  Turing’s  work,  and 
extends  this  path  to  motivate  a  strengthened  conclusion 
regarding  what  would  be  required  by  a  truly 
Comprehensive Intelligence Test (CIT). The paper begins 
by examining the initial ‘intelligence test’ as proposed by 
Turing, and Searle’s high profile critique of both the TT 
and Strong  AI.  In tracing  the ensuing  dialectic  between 
Searle and his own critics, I support Searle’s rejection of 
the ‘Systems Reply’,  and for reasons based more on the 
philosophical  views  of  Putnam  agree  that  the  original 
Turing  Test  is  fundamentally  inadequate.  The  situation 
becomes more complex with the ‘Robot Reply’ and allied 
Total  Turing  Test  (TTT),  and  I  argue  that  Searle’s 
attempted  refutation  of  the  combined  Robotic-Systems 
reply is unconvincing. However, this is not to say that the 
position  expressed  by  Searle’s  opponents  is  itself 
confirmed,  and  I  argue  that  externalist  views  in  the 
philosophy of  language  first  put  forward by Kripke  and 
Putnam cast serious doubt on the issue. 
In  turn,  the  causal  and  communal  factors 
highlighted  by  externalist  views  in  the  philosophy  of 
language  point  to  the  need  for  a  fundamental  shift  in 
conceptual perspective and a strengthening of criteria in a 
truly  Comprehensive  Intelligence  Test.  I  argue  that  an 
ideal  CIT  should  focus  on  the  category of  cognitive 
system  as  a  whole,  rather  than  on  the  performance  of 
individual  artefacts. From this expanded perspective,  the 
central  question  is  not  whether  an  isolated  agent  could 
simulate human performance within the context of a pre-
existing  sociolinguistic  culture  developed  by  the  human 
cognitive  type.  Instead  the  key  issue  is  whether  the 
artificial  cognitive  type  itself is  capable  of  producing  a 
comparable sociolinguistic medium of intelligence, where 
this  essential  medium  is  simply  taken  for  granted  as  a 
precondition of the individual performances evaluated in 
the TT and TTT.   1the 
1    THE TURING TEST AND ‘STRONG’ AI
What  would  be  required  for  a  computational 
artefact  to  count  as  genuinely  intelligent  in 
manner comparable to a human being?  In 1950 
Alan Turing [1] famously proposed an answer to 
this question, and the controversy launched by his 
position  is  still  underway.  Turing  replaced  his 
opening  question  ‘Can  (or  could)  a  machine 
think?’  with  the  more  precise  and  empirically 
tractable question ‘Can (or could) a machine pass 
a certain type of test?’, where the test criteria are 
framed in terms of  behaviour  that is standardly 
held to signify intelligence in the case of human 
beings.  In particular,  the original  ‘Turing Test’ 
(TT)  is  based  entirely  on  linguistic inputs  and 
outputs, and is designed as a free ranging session 
of  questions  followed  by  anonymous  verbal 
responses.  Linguistic  performance  is  an  apt 
choice as a pivotal criterion of intelligence, since 
human language is perhaps our most distinctive 
feature as cognitive agents, and it is an essential 
medium through which most of our higher level 
mental  achievements  are  developed  and 
expressed.  Hence human language will  retain a 
central role throughout the ensuing discussion.
The TT itself is a disputed issue and many 
of Turing’s successors in the field of Artificial 
Intelligence would independently endorse a basic 
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computational  theory  of  the  mind,  wherein 
mentality is held to be explained via the physical 
realization  of  the  right  type  of  abstract 
computational  procedure,  without  accepting the 
TT as an adequate criterion for deeming that a 
machine possesses genuine intelligence. The two 
issues are clearly separable, and one can embrace 
a  computational  approach  to  the  mind  without 
accepting  Turing’s  original  and  quite 
controversial  standard.  According  to  the  wider 
project  embraced  by  ‘Strong’  AI  and  the 
computational paradigm, the relation between the 
abstract  program  level  and  its  realization  in 
physical hardware could still  give an answer to 
the  problematic  nature  of  the  relation  between 
mind and body:  the  mind is  to  the  brain  as  a 
program is to the hardware of a digital computer. 
On this model, computation could then be seen to 
provide  the  scientific  key  for  explaining 
mentality and intelligence.  Cognition in general 
(including  the  human  case)  is  to  be  literally 
described and understood in computational terms. 
2     SEARLE’S BASIC CRITIQUE  
Probably the most high profile criticism, both of 
the  TT  in  particular  and  the  computational 
paradigm  in  general,  was  provided  by  the 
philosopher  John  Searle  in  his  1980  paper 
‘Minds, Brains and Programs’ [2], where Searle 
put  forward  his  celebrated  Chinese  Room 
Argument  (CRA),  designed  to  refute  the  view 
that passing the TT is a sufficient condition for 
genuine understanding or intelligence, as well as 
the more wide-ranging position that a system can 
sustain  genuine  mental  states  in  virtue  of 
instantiating  the  right  type  of  abstract 
computational  procedure.  According  to  Searle, 
computation per se is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient  condition  for  the  presence  of  mental 
states  and  real  intelligence,  and  so  he  deems 
computation to be fundamentally irrelevant to the 
issue. Hence both the original TT and the more 
general  mind/program  analogy  are  summarily 
rejected. 
As is well known, the CRA is based on a 
thought  experiment  in  which  Searle,  a  native 
speaker  of  English  who  knows  no  Chinese,  is 
locked  in  a  room  with  a  massive  rule-book 
written in English. He receives Chinese inputs on 
bits  of  paper  and  mechanically  follows  the 
instruction manual to produce outputs in Chinese 
script. For the sake of argument, we are asked to 
suppose that the manual is so good that he is able 
to  fool  native  speakers  of  Chinese.  They  are 
outside the room giving him the inputs which are 
questions  in  Chinese,  and  by  following  the 
recipes for symbol manipulation provided in his 
rule book, Searle is able to produce appropriate 
Chinese  responses,  and  on  the  basis  of  these 
outputs,  his  questioners  conclude  that  a  fluent 
Chinese speaker is locked inside the room.
But  Searle  doesn’t  understand  Chinese, 
and doesn’t even know basic Chinese vocabulary. 
He’s  just  mechanically  manipulating  random 
‘squiggles and squoggles’ according to a program 
of rules, while the inputs and outputs are, to him, 
totally  meaningless.  He has  no  idea  what  he’s 
been asked or what  he’s ‘answered’.  As far  as 
he’s concerned, it’s just unintepreted syntax with 
no intentional content. For example, suppose one 
of the Chinese questions asked him what was his 
favorite  food,  and  the  output  he  gave  was  the 
Chinese  word  for  ‘hamburger’.  But  he  has  no 
idea what the word means, and he comprehends 
nothing of Chinese, even though he’s just passed 
the Chinese Turing test  by serving as a human 
implementation of the conjectured program. And 
this is radically different than the case of English, 
a  language  Searle  really  does  understand.  He 
knows what a hamburger is – a particular kind of 
greasy foodstuff easily obtained at MacDonalds 
and  Burger  King.  And  this  knowledge  is  a 
specific  property  of  Searle’s  mind,  a  genuine 
intentional state of understanding the word, and 
it’s not equivalent to any pattern of mere verbal 
input/output behavior.
Searle’s broad sweeping conclusion: mere 
success at the ‘imitation game’ and passing the 
TT is  theoretically  inadequate  as  a  criterion of 
intelligence,  and  instantiating  a  computer 
program  has  nothing  to  do  with  genuine 
understanding  or  mentality.  But  in  response  to 
Turing’s original question ‘can a machine think?’ 
Searle says the answer is definitely yes – because 
we are  biological  machines,  and we can think. 
According to him, we can think in virtue of the 
unique physical structure and real causal powers 
of the actual human brain – not in virtue of some 
abstract  formal  shadow,  either  classical  or 
connectionist.
3     THE SYSTEMS REPLY
In the style of Turing’s 1950 article, Searle goes 
on  to  consider  and  dismiss  a  number  of 
objections to his view, the first of which he dubs 
the  ‘Systems  Reply’.  A  defender  of  the 
computational paradigm might argue that perhaps 
Searle  in  isolation  doesn’t  understand Chinese, 
but that’s not the point, because the whole system 
that produces the behavior – room plus manual 
plus  Searle  –  does  understand  Chinese.  Searle 
responds by claiming that he is the only locus of 
understanding in the scenario, and if he doesn’t 
understand Chinese, then nothing else about the 
system does.  It’s  absurd  to  imagine  that  even 
though he  himself  doesn’t  understand Chinese, 
somehow the conjunction of Searle plus pencil, 
slips of paper, instruction manual, four walls, etc. 
understands  Chinese.  His  pencil  and  the  four 
walls  don’t  understand  anything  at  all. 
Furthermore,  suppose  that  Searle  were  gifted 
with  a  photographic  memory,  and  could 
memorize the rule book. Then the entire set-up 
could be internalized, and Searle could perform 
the  rule  governed  manipulations  simply  by 
consulting  his  memory,  sitting  outside  under  a 
tree.  Searle  himself  would  then  be the  whole 
system but he still wouldn’t understand Chinese. 
At this stage I  would agree with Searle 
that  the  System’s  reply  is  not  an  adequate 
rejoinder for defending the original TT, mainly 
because (i) the rest of the system in the original 
CRA scenario isn’t  doing the right sort of thing 
and (ii) the standard TT is woefully inadequate in 
any  case  (but  not  because  of  the  introspective 
angle proffered by Searle – more on this later). 
At  this  juncture  I  would  concur  with  Hilary 
Putnam’s [3] basic critique of the TT: passing the 
test  is  not  an adequate criterion for  concluding 
that  the  computer  genuinely  refers  to  anything 
with the strings of symbols it produces, because 
the  computer  doesn’t  have  the  right  sort  of 
relations  and  interactions  with  the  objects  and 
states of affairs  in the real world that its words 
are supposed to be about. If the computer has no 
eyes, no hands, no mouth, and has never seen or 
eaten  anything,  then  it  is  not  talking  about 
hamburgers when its program generates the string 
of  English  symbols  ‘h-a-m-b-u-r-g-e-r-s’  –  it’s 
merely operating inside a closed loop of syntax. 
In sharp contrast,  our talk of hamburgers 
is intimately connected to nonverbal transactions 
with the objects of reference. There are ‘language 
entry rules’ taking us from nonverbal stimuli to 
appropriate  linguistic  behaviours.  For  example, 
when  given  the  visual  stimulus  of  being 
presented with a pizza, a taco and a kebab, we 
can  produce  the  salient  utterance  ‘Those 
particular  foodstuffs  are  not  hamburgers’.  And 
there  are  ‘language  exit  rules’  taking  us  from 
linguistic  expressions  to  appropriate  nonverbal 
actions.  We  can  follow  complex  verbal 
instructions and produce the indicated patterns of 
behaviour, e.g. finding the nearest  Burger King 
on the basis  of  a  description of  its  location in 
spoken English. Mastery of both of these types of 
rules is essential for deeming that a human agent 
understands  natural  language  and  is  using 
linguistic expressions in a correct and referential 
manner  -  and  the  hapless  TT  computer  lacks 
both.
4     THE TOTAL TURING TEST 
Hence  the  standard  TT  is  fundamentally 
inadequate as a test  for understanding,  because 
the range of behaviour it takes into account is far 
too limited. It relies solely on verbal input/output 
patterns,  and  these  alone  are  insufficient  to 
ground  an  interpretation  of  the  manipulated 
strings.  Language  is  primarily  about  extra-
linguistic entities and states of affairs, and there 
is  nothing  in  a  cleverly  designed  program for 
pure  syntax  manipulation  which  allows  it  to 
break  free  of  this  closed  loop  of  symbols  and 
establish a correlation between word and object. 
When it comes to judging human language users 
in  normal  contexts,  we  rely  on  a  far  richer 
domain of evidence. 
So,  this  criticism  suggests  a  vital 
strengthening of the TT, later dubbed the Total 
Turing Test (TTT) by Stevan Harnad [4], wherein 
the repertoire of relevant behavior is expanded to 
include  the  full  range  of  intelligent  human 
activities. This will require that the computational 
procedures respond to and control not simply a 
teletype  system for  written  inputs  and  outputs, 
but rather a well crafted artificial body. Thus in 
the TTT the scrutinized artefact is a  robot,  and 
the  data  to  be  tested  coincide  with  the  full 
spectrum of behaviors of which human beings are 
normally capable.  In  order  to  succeed,  the test 
candidate must be able to do, in the real world of 
objects  and  people,  everything  that  intelligent 
people can do. This combined linguistic/robotic 
test  obviously  constitutes  a  vast  improvement 
over Turing’s original version, and the range of 
empirical  evidence  now encompasses  all  those 
forms  of  complex  and  varied  interaction 
applicable in the case of our fellow humans. Is 
the  passing  the  much  more  rigorous  TTT  a 
sufficient condition for deeming that the artefact 
is truly intelligent? Harnad and others certainly 
think so, but unsurprisingly, not everyone agrees.
  As  it  happens,  the  TTT  is  already 
anticipated by Searle in his 1980 article, and in 
his ‘Robot Reply’ to the CRA he dismisses even 
this elevated standard with the following line of 
argument. Imagine that the program doesn’t just 
control verbal responses to verbal inputs as in the 
TT. Instead, it controls a robot with an artificial 
body  that  can  successfully  behave  in  the  real 
world just like a person. Surely a device that can 
pass this extended TTT should count as having a 
mind?  Searle’s  response:  the  addition  of 
perceptual and motor capabilities adds nothing to 
the  issue  of  genuine  understanding,  if these 
capabilities are controlled by symbolic processes. 
Accordingly, we can augment the negative CRA 
thought  experiment  and  suppose  that  Searle  is 
locked in the room, and now some of the Chinese 
characters  he receives  are  codes  for  digitalized 
inputs from the robot’s sensory transducers, and 
some  of  the  output  symbols  now  control  the 
motors inside the robot’s body and make it move 
its  arms  and  legs.  Still,  all  Searle  is  doing 
(perhaps remotely, from inside a control room), is 
manipulating  uninterpreted  syntax.  He  has  no 
idea what is going on outside the control room 
and  the  manipulated  syntax  has  no  intentional 
content.  Searle  cannot  see the  tempting 
hamburger that the robot’s photographic sensing 
apparatus has transduced into Chinese code, nor 
is he  trying to grasp it by outputting the salient 
effector code controlling the robotic hand.  
At  this  juncture  I  would  take  Searle’s 
response to be a plausible answer to the question 
of  whether  or  not  he personally  understands 
Chinese, but it is now far from clear that this is 
the relevant issue. Unlike the case of the standard 
TT, many of the pivotal inputs and outputs in this 
more demanding case are no longer manipulated 
directly  by  Searle.  In  order  to  pass  this  much 
more stringent test, the artefact, when viewed as a 
system,  must  perform  physical  behaviors  in 
accordance with the language entry and language 
exit rules appropriate to a genuine understanding 
of  Chinese.  Hence  the  input/output  boundaries 
for the system extend crucially beyond Searle the 
homunculus.  The  robot’s  sensing  devices  will 
comprise  relevant  input  boundaries,  while  its 
artificial  body  and  limbs  will  constitute  the 
salient  output  interface  for  manifesting  the 
scrutinized behaviour.  
So if we apply the systems approach to 
the robot that passes the TTT, then the situation is 
no  longer  comparable  to  the  original  TT/CRA 
scenario, wherein Seale had direct  contact with 
the  inputs  and  outputs  under  evaluation.  Yet 
Searle attempts to re-employ the same polemical 
strategy  as  before,  by  making  the  somewhat 
dubious claim that he could in principle realize 
the entire system himself and still not understand 
Chinese [5]. I am not convinced that this claim 
expresses an authentic theoretical possibility, but 
even if we grant Searle’s hypothesis for the sake 
of  argument,  I  would  hold  that  it’s  still  not 
sufficient  to establish his  overall  conclusion.  If 
Searle could conceivably realize the system and 
become the robot following its instructions, then 
perhaps  Searle  would  not  have  introspective 
access to himself as the realization of a system 
that  understands  Chinese  –  one’s  intuitions 
become fairly stretched at this point. But still, this 
conjectured lack of introspective access does not 
imply that the system does not in fact understand 
Chinese. It only shows that Searle would not be 
aware  of  this  fact,  which  is  not  a  decisive 
allegation, since clearly there are many aspects of 
Searle the highly complex real system of which 
he is personally unaware. And unlike the case of 
his  Systems  reply  to  the  original  TT,  now the 
system  is doing exactly the right sort of things, 
and  the  test  itself  is  no  longer  passable  while 
remaining  insulated  within  a  mere  syntactic 
bubble.
Hence  I  would  conclude  that  Searle’s 
introspective considerations are not adequate for 
deflecting  the  combined  systems-robotic  reply. 
The conjectured fact that Searle might somehow 
realize the entire  system and become the robot 
following  its  program,  while  still  lacking  the 
subjective awareness of Chinese semantics, does 
not  establish  that  the  robotic  system  doesn’t 
understand Chinese.  But this is only to say that 
the argument offered by Searle is unsuccessful at 
refuting  his  opponent’s  claim  that  the  robot 
possess genuine intelligence and understanding – 
it is  not to say that the  positive claim itself has 
thereby been substantiated. And indeed,  I think 
that  other  considerations  still  tend  to  seriously 
undermine the view that the successful TTT robot 
understands  language  in  a  manner  at  all 
comparable  with the  paradigmatic  human case, 
and  that  the  expressions  generated  by  the 
computational artefact  are genuinely referential. 
In  contrast  to  the  simplistic  TT  scenario,  the 
robot can now exhibit mastery of the appropriate 
language entry and language exit rules, and these 
are  clearly  a  necessary  condition  for  the 
referential  use  of  language.  But  are  they 
sufficient?
5     SEMANTIC EXTERNALISM
Externalist  views in the theory of meaning and 
reference originally put forward by Saul Kripke 
[6]  and  Hilary  Putnam  [7],  and  subsequently 
elaborated by Tyler Burger [8],  would seem to 
highlight  essential  features  of  natural  language 
(NL) semantics not present in the case of the TTT 
artefact as currently depicted. The conclusion of 
Putnam’s  influential  Twin  Earth  Argument 
(TEA)  is  that  the  internal  cognitive  states  of 
individual  language  users  radically 
underdetermine  linguistic  meaning  –  there’s 
nothing in the head strong enough to fix reference 
for terms in natural language. 
On  Putnam’s  account,  the  traditional 
‘psychologistic’  approach ignores  two  essential 
aspects of meaning and reference. One (1) is the 
role  of  direct  causal  interaction  with  the 
environment when language is acquired and used: 
natural kind terms such as ‘water’, ‘aluminum’, 
‘gold’,  ‘tiger’,  etc.,  make  indexical  appeal  to 
actual specimens or paradigm cases in the world 
–  so  causal  relations  via  perception, 
demonstrative pointing and utterance production 
in the intersubjectively accessible public domain 
determine  what  these  words  actually  refer  to. 
There is no internal encoding or representational 
state  sustained  by  the  individual  agent  that  is 
powerful  enough  to  do  this.  According  to 
Putnam’s externalist  account,  it  is  a semantical 
fact, quite independent of the mental states of any 
individual  speakers,  that  ‘water’  in  English 
means  ‘the  liquid  with  the  same  underlying 
physical  microstructure  as  the  stuff  in  our 
environment that we interact with when we use 
the word “water”’. Accordingly the word referred 
to this particular liquid even before we knew that 
the relevant molecular structure is actually H2O.
Second  (2),  the  traditional  internalist 
approach ignores what Putnam calls the ‘division 
of linguistic labor’: the reliance on  experts who 
set  the  standards  for  the  entire  linguistic 
community and underwrite the reference relation 
for  natural  language  in  cases  where  relevant 
microstructures  and/or  objective  membership 
conditions are known. It is by acquiring a natural 
language  within  a  particular  sociolinguistic 
community  and  using  it  within  this  shared 
framework that we are able to refer successfully. 
For example, the average English speaker can use 
the  word  ‘gold’  to  talk  about  real  gold,  even 
though  they  may  not  know the  periodic  table, 
may  not  know  that  gold  is  the  element  with 
atomic number 29, and probably don’t not know 
in  practice  how  to  distinguish  real  gold  from 
chalcopyrite.  Most  people  have  had 
causal/perceptual interactions with samples of the 
metal  itself,  and  thereby  have  direct  indexical 
access to the substance the word names. But the 
precise and technical details of the extension of 
the word ‘gold’ are uncovered by relevant experts 
in the field, and it is upon their expertise that our 
linguistic  practice  implicitly  depends,  and  not 
upon  our  own  internal  representations  or 
concepts. 
In  short,  language  is  a  communal, 
historically  evolved  phenomenon,  where  the 
meaning  of  words  is  not  determined  by 
individuals,  but  is  a  public,  external  matter. 
Putnam concludes that we must give up the view 
that meanings are concepts or mental entities of 
any kind. According to his famous slogan ‘Slice 
the pie any way you like, meanings just ain’t in 
the head.’ 
6     ROBOTIC REFERENCE
But if meanings ain’t in the heads of individual 
human agents,  then they’re certainly not  in the 
data bases of computational artefacts. So, in light 
of  (1)  above,  if  the  robot’s  natural  language 
capabilities  are  simply  installed  as  part  of  its 
overall  program,  then  it  will  not  have  the 
necessary history of causal interactions with the 
objects  of reference,  and its symbolic activities 
will  remain  semantically  ungrounded.  On  the 
foregoing  widely  accepted  model  of  ‘direct’ 
reference, there is an essential chronological link 
operating  in  two  directions  that  semantically 
tethers an individual’s linguistic behaviour to its 
environmental context. 
The relation of reference is founded on a 
history of causal interactions between the agent 
and the entities and states of affairs in the world 
that it uses language to talk about and describe. 
The  word  ‘water’  as  used  by  normal  human 
agents is intimately linked to a long history of 
associations  based  on  experiences  of  seeing, 
drinking, washing with, and being immersed in 
various  samples  of  environmental  H2O,  where 
these  experiences  are  all  caused by  the  liquid 
itself, giving the agent direct indexical access to 
water, as the word was acquired and integrated 
into its overall linguistic framework. And in the 
other  direction,  the  speaker,  when  learning 
language  and then  applying  it  proficiently,  has 
repeatedly associated the term ‘water’  with the 
liquid  so  accessed,  through  bodily  and  allied 
verbal ostension (‘look, there’s a pool of  water 
over there’),  and intentionally uses the word to 
pick out the liquid with which it has this history 
of causal/perceptual episodes.
At  this  moment  in  time  it’s  obviously 
rather difficult  to envision exactly how a robot 
might  be  designed  to  pass  the  TTT,  but  if  its 
ability  to  speak  fluent  English  is  simply 
implanted via some sophisticated NLP program, 
then the concomitant lack of an historical chain 
of interaction with the real world poses a serious 
theoretical  question  regarding  the  semantical 
import  of  its  linguistic  input/output  behaviour. 
When a token of the term ‘water’ is emitted by 
the robot,  all  shiny and fresh off  the assembly 
line, does it genuinely mean ‘the liquid with the 
same underlying microstructure as the stuff in our 
environment that we interact with when we use 
the word’? If  part  of its  test  were to discourse 
convincingly on the topic of current theories in 
the  philosophy  of  language,  then  it  would 
certainly  say that  it  did.  But  that’s  a  different 
matter.
Of course, since the robot must be able to 
behave  in  all  the  appropriate  manners  with  its 
artificial  body,  then  after  it’s  been  around  for 
awhile it  will  have acquired a history of direct 
causal interaction with water, and in order to pass 
the test, it must behave  as if it has made all the 
associations  required  to  ground  its  symbolic 
processes. So I do not present the issue of (1) as 
an  insurmountable  obstacle  or  a  conclusive  in 
principle  objection,  but  rather  as  an interesting 
and  potentially  important  case  of  dissimilarity 
with the semantic analysis of naturally occurring 
cognitive systems.  
However, I think that (2) above presents a 
much more serious difficulty when evaluating the 
robot, and one which, even if it could possibly be 
overcome in the case of  an individual  artefact, 
nevertheless suggests that this would still not be 
enough to attain full parity with humans in the 
general  case.  Hence consideration of  factor  (2) 
will then serve to motivate the further claim that 
even  the  combined  linguistic/robotic  TTT  is 
intrinsically  too  limited,  and  that  a  conceptual 
shift  in  goal  posts  is  required  for  a  truly 
Comprehensive Intelligence Test (CIT). But first 
factor (2) itself will be explored in more detail.
In  line  with  Putnam’s  observations 
regarding NL semantics, for the robot’s linguistic 
activities to be genuinely referential in a manner 
comparable to a human being, the robot would 
have  to  acquire  its  linguistic  fluency  through 
interaction not just with its environment, but as a 
member  of  the  relevant  sociolinguistic 
community. And again, this is very different than 
having  its  language  processing  abilities  simply 
programmed in as a finished product, particularly 
if this finished product were predesigned in terms 
of some particular external target language. 
If the robot did not learn its language via 
extended  participation  with  an  actual  and 
embodied  linguistic  culture,  within  a  shared 
physical and social context, then it will not be a 
valid  member  of  any  such  community,  and 
consequently it will be unable to rely upon the 
division  of  linguistic  labour  central  to  our 
referential success. Putnam gives the analogy that 
natural language is not like a hammer, a tool that 
can  be  wielded  successfully  by  an  individual. 
Instead, language is a cooperative social venture, 
more  like  operating a  steam ship or  perhaps  a 
large  industry.  As  bone  fide  members  of  the 
English speaking ‘linguistic cooperative’,  we’re 
automatically  plugged  in  to  this  ancient  and 
highly structured communication system, a living 
cognitive network through which we inherit and 
access the meaning of our words.
For  the  linguistic  activities  of  single 
human beings to be semantically grounded, the 
individuals must belong to and participate in such 
a  communication  network,  a  network  that  is 
anchored to  a  continuous presence  extended in 
both  time  and  space.  People  first  have  direct 
causal interactions with various persons, places, 
objects  and  natural  kinds  in  their  immediate 
surroundings,  and  by  learning  and  exercising 
their  linguistic  behaviours  in  this  shared 
environment,  they enjoy direct  indexical access 
to the referents of the corresponding terms. But 
via full membership in this same NL community, 
they also gain linguistic access to people, places, 
objects, substances and states of affairs remote in 
both  time  and  space.  I’ve  never  been  to 
Madagascar, and Isaac Newton died long before I 
was  born.  Nonetheless,  through membership in 
the  English  speaking  NL  sociolinguistic  coop, 
I’m plugged into this ongoing, far reaching and 
extremely powerful communication network, and 
am able to use English words to successfully talk 
about Isaac  Newton  and  Madagascar,  even 
though I’ve been in direct personal contact with 
neither.
However,  if  the  TTT  robot’s  English 
speaking abilities are simply installed as part of 
some highly sophisticated NLP software package, 
then it  will  lack the essential  history of having 
acquired  these  abilities  through  interaction  and 
participation  in  an  actual  and  embodied 
community.  Its  ‘semantics’  will  be  purely 
internal and solipsistic, tethered to files stored in 
its data bases and various coded representations 
supplied by its designers. And as Putnam’s TEA 
convincingly  shows,  such  internal  states  and 
structures  are  incapable  of  determining  the 
reference  relation  for  even  such  basic  natural 
kind terms as ‘water’. 
Of  course,  in  the  same  vein  as  noted 
above, the combined linguistic/robotic standards 
of  the  TTT  would  require  the  robot  to  have 
extended dealing with human beings while it was 
undergoing  the  test,  and  one  might  then  argue 
that after it had been around for some time and 
had  sufficient  verbal  and  other  behavioural 
interchanges  with  humans,  it  would  itself 
gradually become a card carrying member of the 
English speaking sociolinguistic coop, with full 
rights and privileges. And while a case perhaps 
could be made that a successful TTT robot, fully 
integrated into human society, might eventually 
be deemed a legitimate member of the English 
speaking community, the issue nonetheless points 
to  a  fundamental  feature  of  intelligent  human 
behaviour  that  seems  entirely  absent  in  the 
standard  test  scenarios  considered  so  far,  and 
which this form of mere integration would fail to 
address.
7    A TRULY COMPRENSIVE TEST
Human intelligence as we know it depends in an 
essential manner on membership in a linguistic, 
intellectual community, and furthermore, one that 
has been created and is sustained by conspecifics: 
the intelligent behavior of human individuals is 
inseparable  from  immersion  in  a  historically 
evolved culture of intelligence, where this culture 
is  itself  the  product  of  human cognitive 
processing.  Thus  human  intelligence  as  an 
indigenous  phenomenon  is  not  merely 
individualistic,  but  rather  presupposes  for  its 
development  and  expression  essential 
involvement in a specialized social context that is 
itself a product of the human cognitive type. 
In this sense it is asymmetrical for a truly 
Comprehensive  Test  of  Intelligence  to  focus 
merely  on  the  performance  of  individual 
artefacts, rather than on the overall capabilities of 
the  cognitive  type  to  which  these  individuals 
belong. So the manner in which the much more 
rigorous TTT is envisaged still reveals a crucial 
disanalogy with the human case.  Not  only can 
individual  human  beings  exhibit  the  salient 
patterns of verbal input/output behaviour required 
by  the  original  Turing  Test,  and  full  blown 
mastery  of  the  language  entry  and  exit  rules 
required by the combined linguistic and robotic 
Total Turing Test, but it was the human cognitive 
type,  of  which  such  human  individuals  are 
members, that has produced natural language and 
this advanced culture of intelligence in the first 
place.  And it is with other tokens of this  same 
type  that  we  intermingle  as  a  sociolinguistic 
community  and  upon  whom  our  referential 
success co-depends.
In  sharp  contrast,  the  computational 
artefact involved in the TTT is  not a member of 
this  same  type.  It  has  an  alien  and  artificial 
cognitive  structure  that  is  quite  possibly 
incapable,  at  the  type  level,  of  ever  producing 
natural  language  or  the  kind  of  sociolinguistic 
context which is simply presupposed as a starting 
point by the TTT. It is given a prefabricated stage 
on which to perform acts of post hoc imitation, 
and this kind of test could conceivably be passed 
by a well designed puppet, rather than a robust 
and  genuinely  intelligent  category  of  cognitive 
system.   
On  these  grounds  the  TTT  is  still  too 
weak, because an individual artefact merely has 
to perform successfully in a pre-existing natural 
language community, in a context and medium of 
intelligence  produced  by  a  radically  different 
cognitive type - the same type as its designers! 
Its  behavioural  outputs  can  presuppose 
sophisticated, pre-structured linguistic inputs for 
free,  and  these  can  serve  as  triggers  for 
appropriately  complex  responses.  And  these 
factors make it ambiguous as to whether the locus 
of genuine intelligence resides in the designers or 
in  their  artefact.   However,  human cognitive 
architecture was first tested on primitive and pre-
linguistic  environmental  inputs  that  were 
transformed by members of this type over tens of 
thousands  of  years  to  yield  the  sophisticated 
sociolinguistic  community  presupposed  by  the 
robot  (see  the  discussion  in  my  [9]  for  allied 
points motivated by a somewhat different set of 
considerations)
8     CONCLUSION
A truly Comprehensive  Intelligence  Test  (CIT) 
would require the artefact’s cognitive architecture 
to  start  from scratch,  with  the  same  primitive 
inputs as our pre-linguistic forebears. And this is 
why the standard science fiction scenario of an 
advanced  alien  life  form,  regardless  of  its 
chemical  composition  or  internal  processing 
structure,  is  always  a  more  convincing 
hypothetical  case  of  true  intelligence  than  a 
puppet-like TTT artefact. In contrast to a robot, 
the alien  life  form must  have  evolved its  own 
sociolinguistic  culture  of  native intelligence,  in 
response to its  primitive environmental  stimuli, 
rather  than  exhibiting  programmed  capabilities 
simulating real  intelligence  in  a  pre-existing 
context  for  which  it  was  tailor  made  by  its 
designers. In the speculative case of an advanced 
alien life form, the type of cognitive architecture 
in question would already have passed a CIT. 
So if individual tokens of this alien type 
become fluent  in  English and are  then able  to 
interact  successfully  with  humans  and  pass  an 
interplanetary version of the TTT, then we would 
clearly  be  warranted  in  concluding  that  the 
individual specimens in question passed the TTT 
in virtue of possessing genuine intelligence on a 
par with human beings.  The fact that the alien’s 
cognitive type has already passed its own CIT is 
a  necessary  background  condition  for  the 
deployment  of  the  much  narrower  TTT in  the 
case of particular tokens performing successfully 
in the context of a sociolinguistic medium created 
by humans. 
So  this  points  to  an  important  shift  in 
conceptual  perspective:  a  truly  comprehensive 
test should focus on the capacities of the category 
of cognitive system as whole, rather than on the 
performance of isolated tokens. The original TT 
was deliberately posed as an imitation game, and 
this is an intrinsic limitation on its adequacy. An 
individual artefact could in principle pass the TT 
by  simulating  verbal  intelligence  within  an 
extremely  sophisticated  context  already 
developed by a radically distinct cognitive type. 
Although a vast improvement in many ways, the 
TTT still incorporates this intrinsic limitation, by 
again focussing on a token artefact, specifically 
designed to  mimic  the  full  range  of  intelligent 
behaviour within a cultural network produced by 
a different category of cognitive agent altogether. 
But  rather  than  consider  the  imitation  of  our 
intelligent  behaviour  by  specially  designed 
tokens, the criterion for a CIT should be whether 
the artificial type itself is capable of producing a 
comparable medium of intelligence, starting from 
the  primitive  environmental  inputs  of  our  pre-
linguistic forebears. This advanced and essential 
medium  is  simply  taken  for  granted  as  a 
precondition of both the TT and TTT, yet if an 
artificially  devised  cognitive  architecture  were 
able to develop such a sociolinguistic culture on 
its  own,  this  would  require  and  constitute  a 
genuine manifestation of intelligence, and would 
not be an act of mere simulation.
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